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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. 
SCOTT TYLER STAPLEY, : Case No. 20090318-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The trial court entered judgment against Appellant Scott Stapley for attempted 
murder, a first degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102(l)(c)(i) (2008). The 
judgment is attached as Addendum A. R. 150-51. After Stapley filed the notice of 
appeal, the Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal to thjis Court. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)0') |(Supp. 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to 
present gruesome and prejudicial photographs to the jury in violation of Rule 403. 
Standard of Review: The determination of whether photographs are relevant is 
reviewed "for abuse of discretion. The determination of whether [they are] gruesome is a 
question of law, which we review for correctness. [And a] trial court's ruling under rule 
403 is reviewed for abuse of discretion." State v. Bluff 20b2 UT 66, \ 47, 52 P.3d 1210 
(internal citations omitted), cert, denied, 537 U.S. 1172 (2003). 
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Preservation: The issue was preserved at R. 41-43; 176:15-28; 172:68-69. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provision is relevant to the issue on appeal and set forth at 
Addendum B: Utah R. Evid. 403 (2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below 
On July 31, 2008, the State filed an information against Stapley and co-defendant 
Cody Augustine for attempted murder with injury, a first degree felony offense. R. 1-3. 
The State later amended the information to include an enhancement. See R. 19-21 (dated 
September 2008). The trial court severed Augustine's and Stapley's cases. See^ R. 172:9. 
On January 8, 2009, the defense filed a motion to exclude evidence, including 
gruesome photographs. R. 41-43; see also R. 67-83 (State's response). On January 12, 
the trial court held a hearing and denied the motion. See, e.g., R. 84; 94-100. On January 
13, the two-day trial began. See R. 172; 171. At the end, the jury found Stapley guilty as 
charged. R. 148. On March 26, 2009, the trial court sentenced Stapley to a prison term 
of three years to life. R. 150-51. On April 13, 2009, Stapley filed a notice of appeal. R. 
152. The appeal is timely. See Utah R. App. P. 3 and 4 (2009). Stapley is incarcerated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
According to the State's evidence, early in the morning on July 29, 2008, Kathleen 
Ennis, was awakened by screams. R. 172:80-81, 85. Her 17-year-old son, Justin, was 
outside and bleeding. R. 172:82-83. She helped him into the bathtub and called 911. R. 
172:83. Paramedics arrived and transported Justin to the hospital. R. 172:83-84. 
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According to Justin Ennis, he was awake early in the morning on the 29th. R. 
172:90 (stating he did not go to bed the night before). He b^gan exchanging cell-phone 
text messages with someone at 2:15 a.m. R. 172:90-92. He| thought he was exchanging 
messages with Stacey, a girl he knew. R. 172:92-95 (describing the messages); see also 
R. 172:110 (describing Justin's relationship with Stacey and the nature of the messages). 
They agreed to meet, and at 4:09 a.m., "Stacey" sent a message saying "I'm here." R. 
172:96. After a few more messages, Justin was outside waiting; it was 4:32 a.m. R. 
172:96-98. He waited on the sidewalk. R. 172:98. His dad's service truck was parked 
on the street in front of the sidewalk. See R. 172:100; State's Ex. 2, 3. 
Justin testified he saw a Nissan parked across the street. R. 172:99. He heard a 
door shut, and he heard co-defendant Cody Augustine run around the service truck. R. 
172:101, 111. Justin turned to the west and saw Cody running at him with a knife. R. 
172:101-02. Justin began running to the east, around the truck and into the street. R. 
172:102. Stapley was in the middle of the street. R. 172:102-03, 111. "He had an axe in 
his hand, and he hit [Justin] in the back of the neck." R. 17^:103. Justin continued to 
run and he was tackled by Cody. R. 172:112; 172:104. He tried to fight Cody and 
Stapley as they were "[t]rying to stab [him] and hit [him with their fists] and inflict pain." 
R. 172:104. Justin could not say whether he was hit more t)ian once with the axe. R. 
172:104. As he ran up the driveway, he was "being stabbed" by Cody. R. 172:104, 113. 
Justin was struck 12 times. R. 172:106. His doctor, Thomas White, described the 
injuries. See_ R. 171:19. White described a laceration or puncture wound on the left 
upper back, a stab or a laceration wound higher on the left phoulder, and a wound across 
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the back of the upper neck. R. 171:19-20, 22 (stating the wounds were repaired in 
surgery). According to White, the cut on the back of the neck and a second wound on the 
shoulder at the same angle may have been caused by the axe and may have been inflicted 
in a single contact. See R. 171:24-25, 29. 
Also, Justin suffered a puncture wound on the lower back side of his torso. R. 
171:22. It was "quite deep and consistent with a stabbing sort of mechanism. And, in 
fact, we really couldn't reach the depth of the wound with finger inspection or even with 
retractors. It was worrisome for a wound that had gone all the way in through the back 
into the abdomen." R. 171:22. White performed CAT scans and discovered a hole in the 
colon, which required removal of a portion of the colon. R. 171:23. In addition, Justin 
had a complex wound across the front of his neck and left shoulder. R. 171:20. The 
wound required cleaning and further examination in the operating room. R. 171:21-22. 
According to White, the axe could have been involved in inflicting that injury. R. 
171:25, 29. Also Justin had fresh wounds across the inside of his right hand. R. 171:21. 
White testified that the wounds likely caused by the axe did not cause serious 
physical injury or substantial risk of death. R. 171:26-27, 31. The wound across the 
front of the neck and shoulder involved shoulder muscle. R. 171:27. Likewise, the 
wound on the back of the neck and shoulder "needed to be addressed, sutured, repaired. 
And then the wound was closed with suture material and staples." R. 171:27. Justin was 
in the hospital for four or five days and was released without complications. R. 171:29. 
Justin testified that he was left with scars on his throat, across his left shoulder, 
across the back of his neck, under his rib cage, on his right hand and across three fingers, 
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on his lower left back, on his chin, and on the left side of his face. R. 172:106-08. In 
addition, he has experienced problems with his left shoulder. R. 172:106. 
Deputies Khong and Afatasi responded to the emergency call that morning. R. 
172:119-20,124-25. Khong described blood outside the house. R. 172:120. He deter-
mined Justin was first attacked on the sidewalk in front and then Justin went to the back-
yard and inside the house. R. 172:120-21. Afatasi went inside and spoke to Justin's 
mother. R. 172:125. Also, he walked through and around the house and observed blood 
in the entryway and back door, and "along the side of the hpuse, to the street." R. 
172:125. He found a necklace with an emblem in the front yard, R. 172:126, and he went 
to the hospital to obtain a description from Justin of the suspect car. R. 172:126-27. 
Afatasi returned to the house at 6:30 a.m. and noticed a vehicle in the area 
matching the description that Justin had given. R. 172:127-28. Also, the vehicle had an 
emblem in the back window matching the emblem on the found necklace. R. 172:128. 
Afatasi initiated a traffic stop. R. 172:129. The driver was Stapley. R. 172:129. 
He was with a friend, Chris Bird. R. 172:130. Afatasi pulled Stapley and Chris from the 
Nissan, placed them in the cruiser, and then "Mirandised them." R. 172:131-32. Afatasi 
noticed dried blood on Stapley's face. R. 172:131-32. He mentioned the blood and 
"that's when [Stapley] admitted to, you know, being part of the assault that occurred that 
morning." R. 172:131. Stapley told Afatasi that he had gone with Cody Augustine to 
"beat up Justin." R. 172:132. 
According to Afatasi, Stapley saw Justin outside an4 "told Cody[,] if you are 
going to do something you better do it now. [Tjhat's when Cody got out of the car. 
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[Stapley] followed with the axe" and "Cody and Justin got into an altercation." R. 
172:132. When Justin ran from Cody, Stapley "stopped [Justin] in front of the [truck], 
and swung and hit him in the shoulder." R. 172:133. Stapley acknowledged hitting 
Justin a second time, see R. 171:103-05, and when Justin ran from him, he did not follow. 
R. 172:138. Cody followed Justin into the backyard. R. 172: 138. 
Stapley told Afatasi the axe was gone. R. 172:134. He then worked with police to 
recover it. R. 172:137; 172:139-41 (Deputy Reyes recovered evidence from a backpack 
at a church); see also R. 171:34-46, 53 (Detective Adamson conducted interrogations, 
worked with Stapley to recover items, processed the scene at the Ennis home, and spoke 
with the doctor); State's Ex. 16-33. Afatasi testified that he did not detect any indication 
of intoxication when he spoke to Stapley. R. 172:135. 
Detective Adamson later interrogated Stapley again. R. 171:35. Adamson asked 
Stapley "if he ever thought that hitting someone with [the] axe would or could result in 
death." R. 171:49 (agreeing to the question). In response, Stapley said, "I would be 
lying if I said I didn't think it might, but I never really thought about it; I was just there to 
back up my friend." R. 171:49 (agreeing to the response). 
The State presented evidence of phone calls that Stapley made from the jail. R. 
171:55-56; see State's Ex. 35, 36. During the calls, Stapley referred to himself as a 
soldier, described luring Justin from the house, "swinging the axe and hitting" Justin, and 
getting between Justin and the house to block his escape. R. 171:60-61; State's Ex. 15. 
After the State presented its case in chief, the defense presented three witnesses. 
Chris Bird testified that on July 29, Stapley called early in the morning. R. 171:68. He 
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was in hysterics, panicked and scared. R. 171:69. Chris tolfi Stapley to come over and 
Stapley told Chris what happened. R. 171:69. They drove around and went to 
McDonald's. R. 171:69. Stapley noticed his necklace was gone. R. 171:69. They drove 
back to Justin's neighborhood to see if the necklace was on the ground. R. 171:69. At 
that point, Afatasi pulled them over. R. 171:70. 
Chris was familiar with Stapley's axe. R. 171:72-73< He collected and made 
exotic axes, swords and knives. R. 171:72. He considered Stapley's axe to be "a petty 
toy" and an ineffective weapon. R. 171:73. He compared it to a "roll of aluminum foil." 
R. 171:73. The prosecutor played a recording to the jury w i^ere Chris was interviewed by 
a news agency "and claimed that Stapley's weapon was a harmless toy." R. 171:74; 180. 
The prosecutor apparently found the recording through an internet search engine. R. 180. 
However, the prosecutor did not admit the recording into evidence or save it for inclusion 
in the record on appeal. See R. 171:74; 180. 
Next, Michaela Gill testified that she and Stapley wdre best friends. R. 171:75. 
On July 28, she was with Cody and Stapley. R. 171:76-77. Cody talked about a sexually 
transmitted disease that he had contracted, and he talked about killing his girlfriend's ex-
boyfriend. R. 171:77-78. In response, Stapley told Cody he had "toys." R. 171:78. 
Michaela thought nothing of the conversation. R. 171:78. When she went to bed at 
midnight, R. 171:76, Stapley was drunk, "stumbly," and "slurry." R. 171:78. 
Stapley testified last. He and Cody had been friends for years. R. 171:83. He 
collected weapons, and he owned the axe recovered by officers. See R. 171:84; State's 
Ex. 9. He bought it at a "head shop" and paid $25 or $30. R. 171:84. He kept weapons 
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in his car. R. 171:85-86 (stating the axe and a table leg were in his car). On July 28, 
Stapley and Cody were drinking Seagrams 7 while Cody had a conversation with 
Michaela about a sexually transmitted disease. R. 171:83-84, 86. Cody was in pain from 
the STD. R. 171:87. He wanted the person, who gave the disease to his girlfriend, to 
pay. R. 171:87-88. And he wanted to go to the person's house that morning. R. 171:87-
88. Stapley testified that when he heard his friend in pain, he "told him he wasn't going 
alone." R. 171:88. "I told him I'd be there for him. I'd go with him." R. 171:88. 
Stapley saw Cody sending text messages. R. 171:88. 
At some point, Cody and Stapley got into Stapley's car and drove to Justin's 
house. R. 171:89. They parked on the street and noticed Justin pacing back and forth. 
R. 171:89. He started walking toward the house and was between a utility truck and a 
chain-link fence. R. 171:89. Stapley testified that "[i]f something was going to go down, 
it should go down right then." R. 171:89. He told Cody "now or never. If you are going 
to go, go. I'll be right behind you." R. 171:90. Stapley went to the middle of the street 
and watched Justin run from Cody "right towards me." R. 171:90. 
Stapley swung the axe because Justin was coming at him and it was a reflex. R. 
171:90. He knew he made contact. R. 171:91. Stapley watched Justin double back and 
Cody "was right there." R. 171:91. Cody and Justin collided and wrestled. R. 171:91. 
Stapley circled around to make sure no one else was there, and when he turned again, 
Justin ran right into him. R. 171:91. Stapley was thrown off balance and overcorrected 
and swung at the same time. R. 171:91, 92. According to Stapley, he hit Justin with his 
fist and Justin ran "through the axe" for the second injury on the front of Justin's body. 
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R. 171:92, 103; see also R. 171:103-05 (reflecting Stapley's written statement where he 
stated he hit Justin on the right shoulder with the axe, then went after Justin and hit him a 
second time in the left shoulder); 171:115 (stating Stapley hit Justin twice). 
Justin "continued to run" and Cody followed. R. 171:92-93. Stapley did not 
follow; he was drunk; he heard screaming. R. 171:93. He hesitated for ten seconds then 
he screamed to Cody, "get the f— out of there." R. 171:94. "Let's get out of here. Let's 
bail." R. 171:94. When Cody returned, he was covered in blood. R. 171:94. They got 
into the car, Stapley drove Cody home, and he drove to his pwn house and called Chris. 
R. 171:95. Stapley put the axe in a backpack. R. 171:95-96. When Chris returned his 
call, Stapley was emotional. R. 171:96. He went to Chris's house, told Chris what he 
had done, and gave Chris the backpack. R. 171:96. Chris apd Stapley drove back to 
Stapley's house, went to McDonald's, and drove to Justin's neighborhood for Stapley's 
necklace. R. 171:97. 
When Afatasi pulled them over, Stapley confessed. R. 171:97-99. He cooperated 
in the recovery of the axe,, and he acknowledged that when Adamson asked if the axe 
could result in death, Stapley said, "I'd be lying if I said I didn't know. . . but it takes 
intent." R. 171:100. Also, Stapley told Adamson that he went to Justin's house because 
he was "trying to be a good friend. A good friend would h^ve talked [Cody] out of it, but 
I was - 1 was still out there to protect my friend." R. 171:100-01. Stapley regretted his 
actions. R. 171:101. He never intended to kill Justin. R. 1^71:102. 
After deliberations, the jury returned a verdict for attempted murder. R. 171:154. 
The trial court sentenced Stapley to a prison sentence of three years to life. R. 150-51. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred when it admitted bloody photographs into evidence. The 
photographs were not relevant to the issues at trial. They were gruesome under Utah law, 
where they depicted enlarged and graphic shots of disturbing details. In addition, they 
were unfairly prejudicial and misleading to the jury. In this case, the jury likely rendered 
a verdict for the harshest offense because of the horrific photographs. Stapley 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the jury verdict and remand the case for a 
new trial absent the gruesome photographs. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PREJUDICED STAPLEY BY ADMITTING 
GRUESOME PHOTOGRAPHS IN VIOLATION OF RULE 403. 
A. UTAH'S THREE-STEP ANALYSIS. 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, states the following: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 403 (2009). The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that "some categories of 
evidence, including gruesome photographs, are inherently prejudicial and should not be 
admitted absent a showing of 'unusual probative value.'" Bluff, 2002 UT 66, \ 40 
(citations omitted). "Evidence in these categories is uniquely subject to being used to 
distort the deliberative process and improperly skew the outcome." State v. Lafferty, 749 
P.2d 1239, 1256 (Utah 1988). 
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To ensure against a distortive process, "a court should undertake a three-step 
analysis when considering whether to admit" a photograph into evidence. State v. 
Calliham. 2002 UT 87, f 35, 57 P.3d 220 (citing Bluff 2002 UT 66, f 46). Under the 
three-step analysis, the threshold question is "whether the photograph is relevant." Id. 
(quoting Bluff 2002 UT 66, H 46); see also State v. Gulbran^en. 2005 UT 7, f 34, 106 
P.3d 734. That is, the court will ask whether the evidence "has 'any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.'" Bluff 2002 UT 66, \ 
42 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 401); see also Gulbransen* 2005 tJT 7, ffif 37-38 (stating a 
"stipulation of fact by defense counsel does not make evidence less relevant"; and "the 
'fact that the same evidence could have been provided by purely testimonial means does 
not necessarily make a photograph inadmissible5") (citation omitted). 
Next, the court will "consider whether the photograph is gruesome." Calliham, 
2002 UT 87, \ 35 (quoting Bluff 2002 UT 66, \ 46). For that analysis, the court will look 
to the following non-exclusive factors. 
First, we consider whether the photograph is in coloif or black and white, because 
color photographs are generally more disturbing because of their ability to provide 
the viewer with vivid images of blood, wounds, bruising, and the like. . . . Color 
alone is not determinative, however. . . . Second, we consider whether the photo-
graph is an enlargement or close-up shot, again, because enlarged photographs and 
close-ups show greater detail and therefore are oftenj more disturbing than a life-
like view. . . . Also, an enlargement or close-up may give a distorted impression 
of the thing photographed. Third, we consider when the photograph was taken in 
relation to the crime and whether it depicts the victipi as found at the crime scene. 
. . . Fourth, we consider whether other details in a photograph, aside from the 
victim, may render a photograph gruesome [becausq] the composition in the 
photograph may exacerbate the photographs impact on the viewer. 
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Bluff, 2002 UT 66, Tf 43 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Varzas. 2001 UT 5 4 
52, 20 P.3d 271); State v. Barber. 2009 UT App 91,f60, 206 P.3d 1223. "The purpose 
of considering these factors is to identify photographs that have a tendency to 'unfairly 
prejudice, inflame, or mislead the jury.5" Bluff 2002 UT 66, If 43 (citation omitted). 
And finally, the court will apply a balancing test that hinges on whether the 
photograph at issue is gruesome or not. See^ Calliham, 2002 UT 87, f 35. If it is grue-
some, the burden shifts to the State to show that "the probative value of the photograph 
outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice." IcL (quoting Bluff 2002 UT 66, f 46). 
It is true that shifting the burden to the State runs contrary to the general 
presumption of admissibility favored by the Rules of Evidence. However, we 
have determined that this departure from the general rule is both necessary and 
equitable. The decision to admit a crime scene or autopsy photograph generally 
must be made early in the proceedings, before its probative value can be easily 
ascertained. Given that this evidence, by definition, has a tendency to confuse and 
inflame the jury, we believe it is appropriate for courts to err on the side of caution 
and exclude unfairly prejudicial evidence unless the State can show good cause for 
its admission. 
Bluff 2002 UT 66, f 45 (footnote omitted). According to the Utah Supreme Court, a 
photo has "limited probative value" if it merely corroborates "uncontested facts" or the 
credibility of a witness whose testimony is not "of great importance in the case and hotly 
contested by the parties." See Calliham, 2002 UT 87, f 40. 
On the other hand, "[i]f the photograph is not gruesome, the court may apply the 
standard rule 403 balancing test," Bluff 2002 UT 66, \ 44, which allows the State to 
admit the photograph in evidence "unless the defendant can show that the risk of unfair 
prejudice outweighs the probative value of the photograph." Calliham, 2002 UT 87, K 35 
(quoting Bluff 2002 UT 66,t46). 
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In State v. Poe, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting slides of the 
victim's dissected brain cavity because there was no question that the victim died of 
bullet wounds to the head and the "only purpose served was to inflame and arouse the 
jury." 441 p.2d 512, 515 (Utah 1968). Although "[i]t coul4 very well be that the jury 
would have returned the same verdict absent its view of the slides," the supreme court 
reversed because the slides may "have tipped the scales in favor of the death penalty." 
Id. Similarly, in State v. Wells, the supreme court ruled that the trial court erred by 
admitting three color photos of the bullet wound - one with the shirt on, one with the 
shirt removed and dried blood, and one with the shirt removed and no blood. 603 P.2d 
810, 812-13 (Utah 1979). The photos had "no evidentiary value" because the defendant 
"did not dispute shooting" the victim. LL at 813. Thus, the only purpose served in 
admitting the photos was the "hoped-for emotional impact on the jury." IcL Notwith-
standing the error in admitting the photos, the supreme court affirmed the conviction 
because a "'review of the entire record'" showed harmless error. IcL (citation omitted). 
In Bluff, the supreme court determined that autopsy photos were admissible. 
There the defendant was charged with murder, child abuse, and child sexual abuse in 
connection with the death of her three-year-old child. 2002 UT 66, % 1. At trial, the 
defendant claimed the child fell down the stairs, and she claimed she was unaware of the 
child's injuries. IcL at fflf 11-12. The State presented photos of the child. "Each of the 
four photographs" was in color, and enlarged, but they presented little danger of unfair 
prejudice because they depicted "cleaned wounds and little., if any, blood." IcL at fflf 49-
50. Also, the photos did not "distort the 'thing photographed in any way. Not one of the 
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photographs was taken at the crime scene.5" hL at \ 50. 
Moreover, the photos were "highly probative of the State's contention that 
[defendant] knew about [the child's] injuries and that the injuries did not result from an 
accidental fall down the stairs." IdL at f 53; see also ijL_ at \ 51 (stating that "details in the 
photographs" were unpleasant "due to the injuries inflicted on [the victim]," but the 
pictures accurately showed the injuries). The "probative value of the photographs 
substantially outweighed any prejudicial effect." hL at f^ 53; see also Gulbrarisen. 2005 
UT 7, f 39 (stating a close-up monochromatic photo was not gruesome); Calliham, 2002 
UT 87, If 40 (stating photos were admissible even though they "posed a risk of unfairly 
prejudicing the jury," because they corroborated the "credibility o f a witness whose 
testimony "was of great importance" and "hotly contested"); Vargas, 2001 UT 5, ]fl| 50, 
53-56 (stating that autopsy photos showing the victim's shaven head and fractured skull 
were "in color, close-up, slightly enlarged, and depicted the body after it had been moved 
from the crime scene"; nevertheless the photos were not gruesome or inflammatory). 
B. THE THREE-STEP ANALYSIS COMPELS THE DETERMINATION THAT 
THE PHOTOGRAPHS HERE WERE INADMISSIBLE. 
Prior to trial, the defense made a motion to exclude photographs of Justin's 
wounds. See R. 41-43; 176:15-19 (moving to exclude photographs and stating the prose-
cutor has "other means and methods for describing" the wounds with diagrams, drawings, 
or descriptions). The trial court held a hearing and ruled the State would be limited to 
presenting one photograph of each injury. R. 99; 176:27-28 (stating where there are two 
photos of an injury, "I simply will have you limit it to one"); see also R. 94-100 (the 
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court's order).1 A copy of the trial court's ruling is attached as Addendum C. 
The State introduced the photographs as exhibits 10 through 14. The photographs 
depict open wounds and caked blood on Justin's torso. Specifically, exhibit 10 shows a 
stab wound on the left upper back and two puncture wounds on the left shoulder; exhibit 
11 shows a laceration across the back of Justin's neck, two puncture wounds on the back 
of his left shoulder, and a wound on the back of the right shoulder; exhibit 12 shows 
Justin's face, neck, and chest caked in blood, an open wound across his left front shoulder 
and a wound across the front of his neck; exhibit 13 is a closer view of the wound 
running across the front of Justin's neck and the wound on His front right shoulder; and 
exhibit 14 shows a puncture wound on the lower left side of his torso and lacerations 
across his right hand. See_ State's Ex. 10-14. The photographs are attached as Addendum 
D. The trial court abused its discretion in admitting them in evidence. 
(1) The Photographs Failed the Threshold Question of Relevance. 
Under the threshold question of relevance, Stapley acknowledged he hit Justin 
with the axe. He swung the axe and he knew he made contact the first time, then he 
1
 Although the trial court made "findings of fact" for its or^er on the motion in limine, 
see R. 94-96, it did not receive testimony on the issues. See R. 176. Also, the trial court 
did not assess witness credibility or competency. IcL Consequently, this Court will not 
give deference to the trial court's factual findings. See Matter of Adoption of Infant 
Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (refusing to give deference to 
findings where "no evidentiary hearing was held," and stating "this court is in as good a 
position as the trial court" to examine the issue de novo) (citation omitted); see also State 
v. KillpacK 2008 UT 49, ffi[ 12, 18, 41-54, 191 P.3d 17 (recognizing the trial court made 
findings of fact in granting a 404(b) motion; and reviewing the matter for an abuse of 
discretion under the test for 404(b) evidence without reference to the findings or 
marshaling standard). 
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circled around and hit Justin a second time. R. 171:90-92. State's Exhibit 11 depicts the 
wound running from the back of Justin's neck to the back of his right shoulder. For the 
second hit, Stapley said Justin ran "through the axe." R. 171:92, 103; see R. 171:103-05 
(reflecting Stapley's written statement that he hit Justin twice); 172:104 (Justin could not 
say whether he was hit a second time with the axe). State's Exhibits 12 and 13 depict the 
wound running across the front of Justin's neck and continuing to his left shoulder. 
In this case, the photographs designated as exhibits 11, 12, and 13, had "limited 
probative value, serving only to corroborate uncontested facts." Calliham, 2002 UT 87, \ 
40. That is, Stapley admitted repeatedly that he was "part of the assault that occurred that 
morning." R. 172:131; see also R. 171:69 (he told Chris Bird what happened); 171:99 
(he made admissions to Afatasi). He acknowledged that he hit Justin with the axe. See 
R. 171:89-92, 103-05. He knew he made contact. R. 171:91,92. Since he 
acknowledged his part in the attack, photographs depicting injuries caused by the axe 
were superfluous and irrelevant. In addition, photographs 12 and 13 were of the same 
wound. See State's Ex. 12, 13. By presenting both photographs, the State was in direct 
violation of the trial court's order. See R. 99; 176:27-28 (ruling the State would be 
limited to one photo of each injury). 
Also, the photographs were irrelevant since the State called Justin and Dr. White 
to testify to the injuries. Justin stated he was struck 12 times. R. 172:106; see also R. 
172:105-08 (describing injuries). White described a laceration on the back of the neck 
running to the back of the right shoulder as one site. R. 171:24-25; State's Ex. 11. And 
he described a complex wound across the front of the neck running to muscle on the front 
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left shoulder. R. 171:20, 25, 27, 29, 31; State's Ex. 12, 13. In addition, White described 
knife wounds, including a deep puncture wound on the left upper back, R. 171:19-20; 
State's Ex. 10; a wound higher on the left shoulder, R. 171:19-20, 22; State's Ex. 10, 11; 
a puncture wound on the lower left side of his torso "consistent with a stabbing sort of 
mechanism," R. 171:22; and fresh wounds across the inside of Justin's right hand. R. 
171:21; State's Ex. 14. He described cleaning, examining, and repairing the wounds. R. 
171:21-22, 23, 27. Given the testimonial evidence, the photbgraphs were unnecessary. 
Moreover, the exhibits depicting puncture wounds ar^ d knife stabs were not 
relevant to this case. Specifically, exhibit 11 in part, and exhibits 10 and 14 reflected 
deep puncture wounds on the back of the left shoulder (exhibits 10 and 11), a wound on 
Justin's lower chest (exhibit 14) and lacerations on his right hand (exhibit 14). Those 
wounds plainly were caused by Cody's knife. See, e.g., R. 172:104, 113 (stating Justin 
was stabbed by Cody); 172:106 (stating Justin was struck l l times); see also 171:22, 28 
(describing the deep puncture wound on the back lower left side of Justin's torso, and 
acknowledging it likely was caused by a knife); 171:92-94 (stating Cody followed Justin 
to the back of the house and Stapley heard screaming). 
Yet Stapley was not charged as an accomplice to Cody's conduct. See_ R. 172:6-
10 (denying the State's request to amend the information to charge Stapley as a party to 
Cody's conduct). He was not on trial for Cody's mental state or for the stab wounds 
caused by the knife. See id. He was on trial for his own conduct, his own mental state, 
and the injuries he caused. Consequently, the photographs depicting injuries caused by 
Cody were wholly unwarranted. See State's Ex. 10 and 14+ State's Ex. 11, in part. 
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(2) The Photographs Were Gruesome. 
Next, the photographs were gruesome. See Bluff. 2002 UT 66, ^ 47 (stating "[t]he 
determination of whether a photograph is gruesome is a question of law, which we 
review for correctness"). State's Exhibits 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 are in color, and "color 
photographs are generally more disturbing because of their ability to provide the viewer 
with vivid images of blood, wounds, bruising, and the like." M at f^ 43 (citations 
omitted). In addition, each photograph is a close-up shot of a gaping laceration or a deep 
puncture wound with exposed tissue and fluid, and dried blood. See_ State's Ex. 10-14; 
see also R. 176:16 (stating the photographs are "extremely troubling" to view). The 
close-up shots "show greater detail and therefore are often more disturbing than a life-
like view." Bluff 2002 UT 66, \ 43 (citations omitted). Also, exhibits 12 and 13 are 
duplicates, apparently intended to compound the shock value. See, e.g. R. 99; 176:27-28 
(ruling the State would be limited to one photo of each wound). 
Moreover, since some photographs depict puncture wounds and injuries caused by 
Cody (State's Ex. 10 and 14; State's Ex. 11, in part), they "give a distorted impression," 
id., to the jury of injuries inflicted as a result of Stapley's conduct. See supra. Part B.(l), 
herein. Indeed, the photographs contain "other details" aside from the injuries at issue in 
this case, and they were admitted in an effort to impact the viewer. See Bluff 2002 UT 
66, |^ 43 (citations omitted). Also, the photographs were taken shortly after the crime and 
show fresh blood and tissue in wounds and dried blood covering Justin's body. State's 
Ex. 10-14. The factors for assessing whether the photographs are gruesome are met. The 
photographs were intended to shock and inflame the jury, State's Ex. 10-14, and they 
18 
served to mislead the jury where the State included photographs of injuries inflicted by 
Cody. See State's Ex. 10, 14; see also State's Ex. 11, in partj. 
(3) The State Was Required to Establish the Probative Value of the Photographs. 
Since the photographs were gruesome, the State was required to show that "the 
probative value of the photograph outweigh[ed] the risk of u^air prejudice." Calliham, 
2002 UT 87,135 (quoting Bluff 2002 UT 66,%46). The Stkte failed to make that 
showing here. Indeed, the photographs - while horrific and disturbing - lacked "'unusual 
probative value.'" Bluff 2002 UT 66, f 45 (citation omitted). Since Justin and his doctor 
were able to testify to the details of each wound, the photographs added only shock value. 
Specifically, Justin testified that he was struck 12 times. R. 172:106. He described his 
wounds, and he removed his shirt to allow the jury to obserVe scars on his throat, across 
his left shoulder, across the back of his neck, under his rib c^ge, on his right hand and 
across three fingers, on his lower left back, on his chin, and on the left side of his face. 
R. 172:105-08. Also, he described problems with his left shoulder. R. 172:106. 
In addition, Dr. White described each laceration and puncture wound, see R. 
171:19-22; and he opined that some wounds were caused by a "battle axe," R. 171:24-25, 
29; and injuries were caused by an instrument that plunged deep. R. 171:20-22, 28 
(recognizing the deep injuries likely were caused by a knife). Dr. White described 
cleaning, probing and examining the wounds, performing surgery, conducting tests, and 
suturing, dressing, and repairing each site. R. 171:21-23, 27. Nothing prevented White 
from diagramming or drawing injuries or explaining each wound with use of a chart. 
Moreover, other witnesses were available to provide testimony about the wounds. 
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Justin's mother, Kathleen Ennis, found Justin outside and bleeding. R. 172:82-83. She 
brought him into the bathroom and called 911. R. 172:83. Nothing prevented her from 
describing her observations. In addition, paramedics and police officers arrived and 
observed Justin and talked to him about the events that morning. See_ R. 172:83-84 
(stating paramedics arrived); 172:126-27 (stating Deputy Afatasi met with Justin at the 
hospital). 
Since the photographs lacked unusual probative value, their main purpose was to 
"inflame and arouse" the jurors and to overwhelm them with graphic photos of gaping, 
bloody wounds. See_ Poe_, 441 P.2d at 515. The photographs were unusually prejudicial 
given the other methods available to the State to describe injuries that were not life 
threatening. See R. 171:26, 31 (stating the wounds likely caused by the axe did not cause 
serious injury or substantial risk of death); 171:27, 31 (stating the wound to the front of 
the neck and the left front shoulder hit muscle, but did not hit an artery). Under the 
balancing test, the limited probative value of the photographs was substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, particularly since Stapley did not contest his 
involvement in the attack. See_ R. 172:131-33, 137-38 (reflecting Stapley's admissions); 
171:90-92 (reflecting Stapley's testimony); 171:103-05 (reflecting Stapley's written 
statement); see also Calliham, 2002 UT 87, f 40 (stating gruesome photos have "limited 
probative value" if they serve "only to corroborate uncontested facts"). The trial court 
abused its discretion when it allowed the State to present the photographs in evidence. 
In the alternative and in the event this Court rules that the photographs were not 
gruesome, Stapley must show that "the risk of unfair prejudice outweighfed] the proba-
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tive value of the photograph[s]." Calliham. 2002 UT 87, % 35 (quoting Bluff 2002 UT 66, 
Tf 46). Stapley made that showing in the trial court here. Specifically, Stapley repeatedly 
acknowledged his involvement in the events on July 29. R. 172:131-33, 137-38; 171:89-
92, 103-05. He admitted he was with Cody and he used an axe to inflict injury on Justin. 
R. 171:89-92; see also 171:103-05 (reflecting Stapley's written statement); 171:115 
(stating Stapley hit Justin twice). Stapley cooperated with police officers and he 
answered their questions. R. 172:131-33, 137-38; 171:47-48. Under the circumstances, 
the jury was required to assess Stapley's conduct and his mental state. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-501(2) (2008) (stating the elements relate to conduct and mental state). 
The gruesome photographs were not probative of the issues, but served mainly to 
mislead and inflame the jury. They provided a "hoped-for epiotional impact on the jury." 
Wells, 603 P.2d at 813. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it confuses the jury, "'appeals 
to the juryfs sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish,5 or 
otherwise . . . 'causefs the] jury to base its decision on something other than the 
established propositions in the case.'" State v. Bartley, 784 P.2d 1231, 1237 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) (citations omitted); Diversified Holdings, L.C. v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, ^ f 38, 
63 P.3d 686 (where evidence may have led to confusion, it was properly excluded). 
Since Stapley acknowledged his involvement in the attack and the State had 
alternative methods for presenting evidence of the wounds, the photographs offered 
"'scant'" or cumulative value and were presented "'for the sake of [their] prejudicial 
effect.5" Bartley, 784 P.2d at 1237 (citations omitted); see also State v. Lindgren, 910 
P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing that if 0vidence confuses the jury, 
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appeals to it sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, or provokes its instinct to punish, the 
evidence may be unfairly prejudicial and inadmissible); Diversified Holdings, L.C.* 2002 
UT 129, If 38 (stating that evidence leading to confusion or speculation about "what 
might have been" was properly excluded). Based on the balancing test, the trial court 
abused its discretion in admitting the photographs in evidence. The photographs violated 
Rule 403. 
C. THE ERROR WAS HARMFUL. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that '"[e]ven if the evidence was erroneously 
admitted, that fact alone is insufficient to set aside a verdict unless it has "had a 
substantial influence in bringing about the verdict."5" Bluff, 2002 UT 66, % 47 (citations 
omitted). In addition, it has articulated the prejudice standard for evidentiary error as 
follows: "If, in the absence of the evidentiary errors, there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome for defendant, we must reverse the conviction." State v. 
RimmascK 775 P.2d 388, 407 (Utah 1989); State v. Mitchell 779 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 
1989) (in assessing harm, the court will not apply the sufficiency-of-the-evidence 
standard; "rather, it focuses on the taint caused by the error"). 
"In analyzing errors, we are guided by the fundamental principle that all the rules 
relating to the conduct of criminal trials are meant to provide a fair, reasonable and 
practical means of doing justice. Where the error is one in which the fundamental 
fairness of the procedure by which the result is reached is drawn into question so as to 
cast doubt on the result, then reversal is warranted." State v. Lenaburg, 781 P.2d 432, 
436-37 (Utah 1989) (internal citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds as stated in 
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State v. Deporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997). 
In this case, Stapley was prejudiced by the admission of the gruesome 
photographs since the photographs "tipped the scales in favor o f a conviction on the 
harshest offense. Se£ Poe_, 441 P.2d at 515; R. 171:154-55 (rendering a verdict for 
attempted murder). Specifically, the evidence in this case supports that Stapley did not 
go to Justin's house with an intent to kill. R. 171:102; see also R. 171:49, 100. He 
intended to provide back-up for Cody. R. 171:88-90, 101. He swung at Justin the first 
time as a reflex. R. 171:90-91. And he swung at Justin a second time when he was 
knocked off balance. R. 171:91-92. Stapley did not inflict life threatening injuries. R. 
171:26, 31. Thus, the evidence supported a verdict for a lesser offense. See_ Mitchell, 
779 P.2d at 1122 (recognizing that prejudice is established if, absent the error, there is a 
likelihood that the defendant would be convicted of a lesser offense). 
Indeed, the jury was instructed with respect to several alternative offenses, 
including the lesser offense of aggravated assault with serious bodily injury, a second 
degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(a), (2) (2008); and the lesser offense 
of aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon, a third degree felony under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(b), (3) (2008). R. 134; 140; 142. The evidence supported a verdict 
on those lesser offenses, where Stapley inflicted injuries an$ used a weapon. See R. 
171:89-92 (admitting he used the axe); R. 171:26-27, 31 (stating the wounds inflicted 
with the axe were not serious and did not cause a risk of death, but the axe hit muscle). 
However, in this case, the gruesome photographs aroused a sense of horror in jurors, 
inflamed jurors, and provoked jurors to punish by rendering a verdict on the most severe 
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offense: attempted murder, a first degree felony offense. R. 171:154-55; Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-4-102(l)(c)(i). Given the prejudicial impact of the horrific photographs, the 
erroneous evidentiary ruling should undermine this Court's confidence in the verdict. 
Absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have rendered a 
verdict on a lesser offense for aggravated assault. See MitchelL 779 P.2d at 1122 
(recognizing that prejudice is established if, absent the error, there is a likelihood that the 
defendant would be convicted of a lesser offense). This Court may reverse the conviction 
in this case due to the evidentiary error. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the record and established law, Stapley respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the conviction for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this 1 s t day of [VWiU , 2010. 
Linda M. Jones 
Scott Wilson 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Clerk 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
SCOTT TYLER STAPLEY, 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS 
IN LIMINE 
Case No. 081905752 
Defendant. Honorable Judith S.H. Atherton 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER CAME BEFORE the Court for hearing and 
determination of the defendant's motions in limine on January 12, 2009. Scott Wilson 
represented the Defendant. Stephen L. Nelson and Michael S. Colby, Deputy District 
Attorneys for Salt Lake County, represented the State. Based upon representations of 
counsel, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
I. Findings of Fact 
1. The defendant's property, a necklace depicting the "hatchetman" logo of the 
Psychopathic Records label, was found at the sce^ ie of the offense; 
2. The defendant was apprehended and arrested after driving by the scene of the 
alleged offense in a car with a large "hatchetman" sticker in the rear window 
while police officers were processing the crime Scene; 
3. The passenger of the defendant's car was found to be in possession of 
numerous weapons; 
4. The police also found other weapons in the car within the defendant's 
constructive possession; 
5. When the victim was taken to the hospital, a number of photos were taken of 
the victim's condition and the victim's injuries; 
6. These photos depict the wounds the victim received from the defendants, and 
the blood that covered these wounds; 
7. The photos are graphic, sobering, and may be possibly disturbing to some; 
8. After the defendant Stapley was arrested, police arrested the defendant 
Augustine and interviewed him, wherein he made statements admitting to 
participating in the alleged offense, and admitting to being a "juggalo;" 
9. According to Augustine's defense attorney, Augustine does not plan to testify 
at the trial, but rather plans to assert his privilege against self incrimination 
under the Fifth Amendment; 
10. This case has generated a substantial amount of pre-trial publicity; local 
television cameras and newspaper reporters have attended almost every 
hearing on this matter; 
11. In their written coverage of this case, both KSL and KTVX reference 
"juggalos." Seehttp://www.abc4.com/news/local/story/Tv/o-men-attack-teen-
with-medievaI-battle-ax/Uk9xwt6VHkCd2sNqTLVWBw.cspx. See also 
http://www.ksl.com/?nid=148&sid=3 896502; 
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12. It is not just the local media, however, who are interested in this case. For 
example, a www.google.com search for "juggalo n^d axe and Utah" yields 
5,360 hits. See 
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&rlz=lT4ADBF_enUS220US223&q=ju 
ggalo+axe+utah; 
13. Important to note, is that many people in the community have strong feelings 
about this case. For example, 338 people have posted written comments about 
this case on KSL's website site. See 
http://www.ksl.com/index.php?nid=148&sid=3896502&comments=true; 
14. Some of these comments express positive feelings or even solidarity with the 
defendants, and some comments are quite negative against the defendants, and 
against "juggalos" and "juggalo" culture generally. 
II. Conclusions of Law 
1. The Utah Rules of Evidence define "relevant evidence" as "evidence 
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable ... than 
it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid 401; 
a. "[A]ll relevant evidence is admissible [in Utah courts], except as 
otherwise provided ..." Id. At 402. Utah appellate courts give trial 
courts considerable discretion in deciding whether or not evidence 
submitted by a party is relevant. Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 
1286 (Utah 1976); 
b. The Utah Rules of Evidence allow trial courts to exclude relevant 
evidence "... if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury. . ." UtahR. Evid. 403; 
c. Because the defendant was wearing his "hatchetman" necklace during 
the attack on the victim (and left the necklace at the scene of the 
crime), and because the police were able to connect the defendant to 
the crime scene by his "hatchetman" sticker in the rear window of his 
car, both the defendant's "hatchetman" necklace and "hatchetman" car 
sticker are relevant to the trial in this case, and therefore admissible; 
d. The State's witnesses, however, may not refer to these pieces of 
evidence as related to "juggalos" or "gang activity." In fact, the word 
"gang" may not be used at all in the State's presentation of its case; 
2. The Utah Rules of Evidence provide that the "credibility of a witness 
may be attacked by any party..." Utah R. Evid. 607. Specifically, 
"[b]ias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to 
impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by 
evidence otherwise adduced." Utah R. Evid. 608; 
a. The Utah Supreme Court has said that juries need sufficient 
information to fully appraise a witness's biases and motivations. State 
v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah 1987); 
b. "Juggalos" are a tight-knit community, and refer to each other as a 
"family;" 
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c. If the defense witnesses are "juggalos," they may have an interest in 
protecting the defendant and shielding hin^ from culpability through 
their testimony which the State is able to dxplore in cross examination 
so that the jury may determine whether the witness is biased; 
It is important that the voir dire process in this case will ensure 
fairness for both parties; 
a. If a prospective juror is especially sympathetic towards "juggalos," or 
especially hostile towards "juggalos," it could impact their ability to 
impartially act as a juror in this case; 
b. Because this Court, therefore, is interested in knowing what prior 
knowledge and feelings towards "juggalos" prospective jurors will 
bring to this case, this Court is authorizing the voir dire process in this 
case to include questions about jurors' knowledge of "juggalos" and 
"juggalo" culture; 
If a defendant objects to photographs of a victim's injuries offered by 
the State on the basis that the photographs are likely to inflame the 
jury based on their graphic depictions, tri^ tl courts must first determine 
whether a photo is relevant, and then whether the photo is a gruesome 
photograph; 
a. A photograph is relevant if it meets the standards of Rules 401,402, 
and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, described above. 
b. State v. Vargas, 20 P.3d 271, sets forth a four-pronged test for 
determining whether a photograph is gruesome: 
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i. First, whether the photograph in color or black and white; 
ii. Second, whether the photograph an enlargement; 
iii. Third, whether the photograph is taken at the crime scene or 
some other place; and 
iv. Fourth, whether there are other details in the photograph, aside 
from the victim, that render a photograph gruesome; 
c. The photographs in this case are relevant under the applicable Rules of 
Evidence because the State is required to show that the defendant 
acted with the specific intent to kill the victim; 
d. The photographs offered by the State do not meet all the Vargas 
criteria, and should therefore be admissible; 
e. Specifically, while the photos are in color and are enlargements, the 
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photographs were taken at a hospital as opposed to the crfjne scene and^/ 
do not depict any other details (aside from the victim) that render the 
^/photograph gruesome; - . 
f. The State, (However, may no* offer duplicative photogra^h^ during the U 
/ J presentation of its case; 
Assuming the co-defendant Augustine asserts his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination, he can be declared "unavailable" 
under Rule 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence; 
a. In that case, any statement made by Augustine against his interest 
would be admissible at Stapley's trial; 
b. Relevant statements made by Augustine that would be against his 
interest under Rule 804, and therefore admissible in Stapley's trial, 
would include Augustine's admission to being a "juggalo" because 
that statement indicates his bias, and interest in protecting Stapley as a 
fellow member of the "juggalo" family. 
Based upon the above-referenced Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the 
defendant's Motion in Limine is denied in part and granted ip part. This matter is 
scheduled for jury trial on January 13-15, 2009. 
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